This paper provides a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy. These procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible (SLIIC). We first characterize the (time invariant) continuously differentiable planning procedures that are SLIIC. Then, we study properties such as balancedness, cheatproofness with respect to coalitions, neutrality, individual rationality and we point out the connection with the MDP procedures.
INTRODUCTION
Planning with public goods was studied by Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971) and Malinvaud (1972) in a class of dynamic procedures called the MDP processes. In these procedures, each consumer reports his marginal rates of substitution between public goods and a private good at each instant. The planning bureau uses this information to alter the allocation of public goods and to make transfers of private good. Over time, the plan converges to a Pareto optimum. Moreover, along the way, the utility of each consumer continually increases; i.e. the procedure is individually rational. Champsaur (1976) showed that the class of MDP procedures is "neutral" or "unbiased"; that is, that any individually rational Pareto optimum is the limit point of a member of this class (see Champsaur, Dreze and Henry (1977) for a comprehensive study of stability and of existence of solutions in such procedures).
One important question about MDP processes concerns the incentive for truthful revelation of marginal rates of substitution. Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971) showed that truthful revelation is a local' maximin strategy and consequently also globally maximin. They also observed that at the stopping point of a process, revelation of true marginal rates of substitution forms a Nash equilibrium. Malinvaud (1971) suggested that MDP procedures would converge even if agents "lied" along the way. Indeed, Roberts (1979) proved that if, at each instant, consumers report their Nash equilibrium strategies of the local revelation game (by the local revelation game, we mean that consumers report so as to maximize the instantaneous increase of utility; Nash equilibrium is unique, but the equilibrium strategies are untruthful except at the stopping point2), the procedure still converges to a Pareto optimum, although at a slower speed than under truthful revelation.
Modelling consumers' behaviour by Nash equilibrium implicitly entails one of two alternative assumptions. Either one assumes that consumers know each other's preferences and so can directly calculate the Nash equilibrium, or one supposes that equilibrium is reached through an iterative adjustment procedure.
One way of avoiding both assumptions is to devise a procedure ensuring that at each instant truthful revelation is a dominant strategy (i.e. is optimal regardless of what other consumers do) for the consumer. Green and Laffont (1979) devised planning procedures with this incentive property but these were neither individually rational nor balanced.3 Using the differential approach of Laffont and Maskin (1980), Fugigaki and Sato (1980) exhibited a class of generalized MDP procedures which are balanced and for which truthful behavior is a locally dominant strategy. One member of this class, moreover, is individually rational; consequently this individually rational procedure converges to a Pareto optimum (see Section 4 below).
In this paper we provide a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy. These procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible (SLIIC).
In Section 2 we set up a model with one private and one public good4 and define our terms. In Section 3 we completely characterize the continuously differentiable planning procedures that are SLIIC. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the transfers to be balanced at each instant. Finally, we show that there exist no twice continuously differentiable planning procedure which is proof from manipulation by coalitions. Section 3 characterizes the class of SLIIC, balanced, individually rational procedures that converge to Pareto optima for the case of two consumers. This class is very large, and in fact is neutral. Yet it contains only one member of the MDP family.
When the number of agents is greater than two, no MDP procedure is SLIIC. However, as with two consumers, the class of SLIIC procedures that are Pareto optimal, balanced, and individually rational is large. In Section 4 we characterize this class (assuming differentiability) for an arbitrary number of consumers.
THE MODEL
We consider economies with N consumers and two commodities: one private good available from initial endowments and one pure public good which can be produced from the private good.
Each consumer i is characterized by a smooth strictly concave utility function Ui(xi, y), defined on the non-negative orthant of R2, where xl denotes the consumption of private good and y denotes the level of public good, and by a positive endowment w' of private good. Moreover 
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is an N-tuple of announced strategies at instant t.
(1) specifies the rate of change of the quantity of public good; (2) describes the rates of change of the private good allocations. The procedure starts at time 0, when y (0) = 0 and x'(0)= w', i = 1,..., N.
As well as considering it as a dynamic system, we can view a planning procedure as a static game in which each agent announces a global strategy (s ( *)), and where the outcome is a stationary point of the dynamic system (1) and (2). However we know from the incentives literature (Hurwicz (1972) and others) that there exist no procedure for which consumers have dominant strategies whose equilibrium outcomes are always Pareto optimal. To obtain positive results we must therefore weaken the incentives requirement if Pareto optimality is to be maintained. We shall do this by assuming that consumers are myopic; i.e. we suppose that they maximize their instantaneous pay off-the rate of change of their utility level, dU'/dt. Given this type of behaviour, we study the class of planning procedures for which, at each instant, the optimal strategy of each consumer is a dominant strategy.
Observe that dt (x' (t) y (0))= i (xi(t),y(t))[rii(xi(t),y(t))Y(s(t))+X'(s(t))]. dt ax'
Thus, under the myopia assumption, each consumer maximizes
IIi (x i)(t)I y(t))Y(s(t)) +X (s(t)).
At each instant, a consumer acts as if he had a linear utility function defined by III. From Green and Laffont ((1979) theorems 4-7) we know that, in searching for a procedure with instantaneous dominant strategies there is no loss of generality in assuming that a consumer's strategy space coincides with the space of marginal rates of substitution.
In this case, a strategy (for consumer i) is just the announcement of a marginal rate of substitution, ql'(t). Equivalently, consumer i can announce a net marginal rate of 
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be the true (net) marginal rate of substitution. Definition 11. A class of planning procedures is neutral or unbiased iff each individually rational Pareto optimal allocation is the limit point of a member of the class.
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CHARACTERIZATION OF SLIIC PLANNING PROCEDURES
Our first step will be to characterize planning procedures that are SLIIC, without worrying about efficiency, balance, or individual rationality. Proof. Consider a coalition of two agents, say agents 1 and 2. 
Considering all coalitions of two agents successively, we conclude that Y(6) must be a constant K. But then Y(a) clearly does not satisfy the condition of Theorem 3.
Therefore the procedure is not Pareto optimal.
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We next seek to construct dynamically efficient SLIIC planning procedures. This objective is easily reached if one can design Pareto optimal, balanced procedures that are individually rational. We show below that this is possible.
PARETO OPTIMALITY, INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY, AND NEUTRALITY WHEN N = 2
Because the arguments are especially simple, we begin with the case N = 2. In Section 5 we extend to arbitrary N.
A complete characterization of autonomous9 SLIIC, Pareto optimal, balanced, individually rational C2-planning procedures is provided in the following theorem. Remark 2. Since incentive compatibility is a "closed" property (that is, inequality (9) is weak), even a non-differentiable point-wise limit of a differentiable sequence {A'l} definies a SLIIC procedure. To ensure that only Pareto optima are stationary points of the limit procedure, the limit function must be strictly increasing. (1981) 
As Champsaur and Rochet
SLIIC PLANNING PROCEDURES WHEN N>2
In this section we generalize the characterization theorems of the previous section to arbitrary N. We begin (Theorem 6) by stating a characterization result that does not impose individual rationality. We then do the same (Theorem 7) in the case where balance is not imposed. Finally in Theorem 8 we prove the counterpart of Theorem 5 forN>2. 
Continuing iteratively, we find that, for given k, if for all t <k, (atY/a(6'1))(6) =0 for 6 e 6*, then 
NOTES
1. "Locally maximin" means "maximizes the minimum instantaneous payoff". "Globally maximin" means "maximizes the minimum ultimate payoff". The instantaneous payoff is the gradient of the utility function whereas the ultimate payoff is the utility of the final allocation.
2. Hurwicz (1972) and Roberts (1979) showed that truthful behaviour cannot constitute a global Nash equilibrium. However, Champsaur and Laroque (1980) showed that, if the procedure is truncated at time T, then the global Nash equilibrium allocations converge to Lindahl equilibria as T tends to infinity. 
